INTRODUCTION
THE characteristic of a revolutionary country is that change is a
quicker process there than elsewhere. As the revolution recedes into the
past the process of change slackens speed. Russia is no longer the dizzying
kaleidoscope that it was in 1917. No longer does it change visibly from
week to week as it changed in 19l8. Already, to get a clear vision of the
direction in which it is changing, it is necessary to visit it at intervals of six
months, and quite useless to tap the political barometer several times a day
as once upon a time one used to do. . . . But it is still changing very fast.
My jourrnal of
"Russia in 1919,"while giving as I believe a fairly accurate pictureof
the state of affairs in February and March of 1919, pictures a very
different stage in the development of the revolution from that which would
be found by observers today.
The prolonged state of crisis in which the country has been kept by
external war, while strengthening the ruling party by rallying even their
enemies to their support, has had the other effects that a national crisis
always has on the internal politics of a country. Methods of government
which in normal times would no doubt be softened or disguised by
ceremonial usage are used nakedly and justified by necessity. We have
seen the same thing in belligerent and non-revolutionary countries, and,
for the impartial student, it has been interesting to observe that, when this
test of crisis is applied, the actual governmental machine in every country
looks very much like that in every other. They wave different flags to
stimulate enthusiasm and to justify submission. But that is all. Under
the stress of war, " constitutional safeguards" go by the board "for the
public good," in Moscow as elsewhere. Under that stress it becomes clear
that, in spite of its novel constitution, Russia is governed much as other
countries are governed,
THE characteristic of a revolutionary country is that change is a
quicker process there than elsewhere. As the revolution recedes into the
past the process of change slackens speed. Russia is no longer the dizzying
kaleidoscope that it was in 1917. No longer does it change visibly from
week to week as it changed in 19l8. Already, to get a clear vision of the
direction in which it is changing, it is necessary to visit it at intervals of six
months, and quite useless to tap the political barometer several times a day
as once upon a time one used to do. . . . But it is still changing very fast.
My jourrnal of
"Russia in 1919,"while giving as I believe a fairly accurate pictureof
the state of affairs in February and March of 1919, pictures a very
different stage in the development of the revolution from that which would
be found by observers today.
The prolonged state of crisis in which the country has been kept by
external war, while strengthening the ruling party by rallying even their
enemies to their support, has had the other effects that a national crisis
always has on the internal politics of a country. Methods of government
which in normal times would no doubt be softened or disguised by
ceremonial usage are used nakedly and justified by necessity. We have
seen the same thing in belligerent and non-revolutionary countries, and,
for the impartial student, it has been interesting to observe that, when this
test of crisis is applied, the actual governmental machine in every country
looks very much like that in every other. They wave different flags to
stimulate enthusiasm and to justify submission. But that is all. Under
the stress of war, " constitutional safeguards" go by the board "for the
public good," in Moscow as elsewhere. Under that stress it becomes clear
that, in spite of its novel constitution, Russia is governed much as other
countries are governed,